Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

DOI10.3982/TE3710MaRDI QIDQ6059522

Aaron M. Kolb, Sebastian Gryglewicz

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic signalinghistory dependencereputation buildingexit dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Consumer strategy, vendor strategy and equilibrium in duopoly markets with production costs

Cites Work

• Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
• Strategic real options
• Reputation building through costly adjustment
• Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• The War of Information
• Progressive Learning
• Reputation for Quality

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