Censorship as optimal persuasion

DOI10.3982/TE4071MaRDI QIDQ6059524

Unnamed Author, Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

censorshipBayesian persuasionmediainformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (2)

Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling ⋮ Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition

Cites Work

• Political disagreement and information in elections
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
• Experimental design to persuade
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Relational communication
• A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure

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