Dynamically stable matching
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Publication:6059528
DOI10.3982/te4187arXiv1906.11391OpenAlexW2954241007MaRDI QIDQ6059528
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.11391
dynamic stabilitycredibilitymarket designexternalitiesstable matchingaftermarketsdynamic matchingsequential assignmentnontransferable utilitydynamic arrivals
Related Items (4)
When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Bipartite choices
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