(Bad) reputation in relational contracting

DOI10.3982/TE4803OpenAlexW3179046024MaRDI QIDQ6059530

No author found.

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4803

zbMATH Keywords

strategic experimentationexpert advicerelational contractingbanditsbad reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• When is reputation bad?
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• Bad Reputation
• Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
• Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

This page was built for publication: (Bad) reputation in relational contracting