The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

DOI10.3982/te4405arXiv1808.07924OpenAlexW3123987044MaRDI QIDQ6059531

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07924

zbMATH Keywords

latticecompetitive equilibriumfrictionsindivisible goodsfull substitutabilitytrading networksimperfectly transferable utilityrural hospitals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (1)

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples

Cites Work

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