A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
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Publication:6059532
DOI10.3982/te3733OpenAlexW2913887446MaRDI QIDQ6059532
Asher Wolinsky, Stephan Lauermann
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3733
Cites Work
- An information inequality for agency problems
- Comparing location experiments
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Search With Adverse Selection
- Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation
- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
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