Long information design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6059533
DOI10.3982/te4557OpenAlexW3201387788MaRDI QIDQ6059533
Marie Laclau, Frédéric Koessler, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4557
stochastic gamesconvexificationconcavificationBayesian persuasionstatistical experimentsinformation designsplitting gamesMertens-Zamir solutionproduct demonstration
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items
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