Informative tests in signaling environments

DOI10.3982/TE4461OpenAlexW4285411472MaRDI QIDQ6059538

Boaz Zik, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4461

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesstrategic information transmissionstrategic learninginformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination

This page was built for publication: Informative tests in signaling environments