Progressive participation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6059539
DOI10.3982/te4636MaRDI QIDQ6059539
Dirk Bergemann, Philipp Strack
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
dynamic mechanism designoption valuerepeated salesstopping probleminterim incentive constraintsinterim participation constraintsobservable arrivalprogressive participationunobservable arrival
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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