Persuasion with unknown beliefs

DOI10.3982/TE4742OpenAlexW4285250804MaRDI QIDQ6059543

Unnamed Author

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4742

zbMATH Keywords

robust mechanism designBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Pivotal persuasion
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Experimental design to persuade
• A User's Guide to Measure Theoretic Probability
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
• Test Design Under Falsification

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