Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
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Publication:6059546
DOI10.3982/TE3030OpenAlexW3184929135MaRDI QIDQ6059546
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3030
optimal controlnonsmooth optimizationconvex analysisprincipal-agent modelstype-dependent participation constraints
Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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