Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
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Publication:6059549
DOI10.3982/te4657arXiv1803.08170MaRDI QIDQ6059549
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.08170
gambler's fallacyBerk-Nash equilibriummisspecified learningendogenous data censoringfictitious variation
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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