Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

DOI10.3982/TE2992MaRDI QIDQ6059551

Humberto Moreira, Daniel Gottlieb

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

contract theorymechanism designprincipal-agent problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Value of communication in agencies
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• Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
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• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

Related Items (2)

Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Designing contracts and information jointly

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