Experimentation in organizations

DOI10.3982/TE3069OpenAlexW2524094435MaRDI QIDQ6059552

Sofia Moroni

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3069

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcontestsprincipal-agentexperimentationexponential bandit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (2)

Monitoring innovation ⋮ Innovation through competitive experimentation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Negatively Correlated Bandits
• Functional Analysis, Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control
• Strategic Experimentation
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• The importance of being honest
• Projects and Team Dynamics
• Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
• The Wage Policy of a Firm
• Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

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