How to sell in a sequential auction market
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6059553
DOI10.3982/te4768MaRDI QIDQ6059553
Kenneth Hendricks, Thomas Wiseman
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
- Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
- A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
- Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms
- Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
