Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
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Publication:6059556
DOI10.3982/te4824OpenAlexW4313153732MaRDI QIDQ6059556
Unnamed Author, Jonathan Newton
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4824
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Cites Work
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