Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

DOI10.3982/te4710MaRDI QIDQ6059560

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Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

communicationBrownian motiondynamic delegationcontrarianquota mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting
• On selecting the right agent
• Optimal Delegation

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