Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
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Publication:6059561
DOI10.3982/te3867OpenAlexW2183447249MaRDI QIDQ6059561
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3867
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