On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings

DOI10.3982/te4723OpenAlexW3117251643MaRDI QIDQ6059562

Thomas Demuynck, Umutcan Salman

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4723

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycomputational complexitymatroidrevealed preference theorytwo-sided matching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

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