Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

DOI10.3982/te4255arXiv2110.06551OpenAlexW2966804372MaRDI QIDQ6059563

Takashi Kunimoto, Siyang Xiong, Yifei Sun, Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.06551

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationsocial choice functionmixed-strategy Nash equilibriumMaskin monotonicityfull implementationinformation perturbations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
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• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
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• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Efficient Auctions
• Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• An Efficient Auction
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

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