Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers

DOI10.3982/te4691OpenAlexW2188279951MaRDI QIDQ6059564

Kyle Bagwell, Manuel Amador

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4691

zbMATH Keywords

regulationprice capsdelegation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
• Veto-based delegation
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• Optimal Delegation
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Commitment vs. Flexibility

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