When Walras meets Vickrey
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Publication:6059566
DOI10.3982/te4296OpenAlexW4312928778MaRDI QIDQ6059566
David Delacrétaz, Claudio Mezzetti, Simon Loertscher
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4296
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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