Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions

DOI10.3982/te4640OpenAlexW4312779620MaRDI QIDQ6059567

Wenzhang Zhang

Publication date: 2 November 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4640

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionfirst-price auctionsbidding rings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• First-best collusion without communication
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

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