Scheduling with package auctions

DOI10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6zbMath1198.91059OpenAlexW2070631019WikidataQ57834532 ScholiaQ57834532MaRDI QIDQ606079

Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi, Thomas A. Finholt, John C. Lin

Publication date: 16 November 2010

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingexperimentspackage auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Package Auctions and Exchanges

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