Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1zbMath1213.91010OpenAlexW2500129896MaRDI QIDQ606269

Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 17 November 2010

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1

zbMATH Keywords

effectivity functiongame formconstitutionNash consistent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium ⋮ Representation of constitutions under incomplete information ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ A brief history of social choice and welfare theory ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ A new game equivalence, its logic and algebra ⋮ A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets

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