Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents

DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01466-2zbMath1527.91068arXiv2101.02423OpenAlexW3118775086MaRDI QIDQ6062957

Haitian Xie, Jin Xi

Publication date: 6 November 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.02423

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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