Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
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Publication:6062958
DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01459-1zbMath1527.91069MaRDI QIDQ6062958
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Publication date: 6 November 2023
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
- Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods
- Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
- To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
- Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels
- Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game
- Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation
- Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
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