On the safety of group manipulation

DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01469-zzbMath1529.91038OpenAlexW4382394120MaRDI QIDQ6062959

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Publication date: 6 November 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01469-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Unnamed Item

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