Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations

DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01474-2zbMath1529.91040arXiv2208.05316OpenAlexW4383645529MaRDI QIDQ6062962

Kazuya Kikuchi

Publication date: 6 November 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.05316

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• A table of normal integrals
• Probability with Martingales
• The electoral college vs. a direct vote: Policy bias, reversals, and indeterminate outcomes†
• The multivariate skew-normal distribution
• Probabilities of Certain Election Results

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