The core for housing markets with limited externalities

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01478-6zbMath1529.91047OpenAlexW3128734399MaRDI QIDQ6063088

Bettina Klaus, Claudia Meo

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01478-6

zbMATH Keywords

strong coreexternalitieshousing marketsweak core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences

Cites Work

• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• On cores and indivisibility
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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