Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
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Publication:6063093
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01483-9zbMath1530.91358OpenAlexW2946960130MaRDI QIDQ6063093
David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01483-9
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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