A theory of national development bank: long-term investment and the agency problem

DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01484-2zbMath1530.91294OpenAlexW4319791890MaRDI QIDQ6063096

Junjie Xia, Jiajun Xu, Shenzhe Jiang, Jianye Yan

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01484-2

zbMATH Keywords

infrastructuredynamic contractagency costnational development banks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Risky utilities
• A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
• Government guarantees and financial stability
• Public employment and economic growth
• Convergence, financial development, and policy analysis
• Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy
• Commitment in Organizations and the Competition for Talent
• Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard

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