On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
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Publication:6063099
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01495-zzbMath1530.91310OpenAlexW4362583648MaRDI QIDQ6063099
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/331205762/ZapechelnyukA2023ETOnTheEquivalenceOfInformationDesign.pdf
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