Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
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Publication:6063100
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2OpenAlexW2787953828MaRDI QIDQ6063100
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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