When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
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Publication:6063102
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01488-yzbMath1530.91434OpenAlexW2908258236MaRDI QIDQ6063102
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01488-y
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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