Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans

DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01490-4zbMath1530.91586OpenAlexW4362670712MaRDI QIDQ6063106

Raunaq S. Pungaliya, Redouane Elkamhi, Latchezar Popov

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01490-4

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selection equilibriumcorporate governancebank loanscovenants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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