Behavioral strong implementation
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Publication:6063107
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0zbMath1530.91139OpenAlexW3047660200MaRDI QIDQ6063107
Michele Lombardi, Ville Korpela, Ritesh Jain, Takashi Hayashi
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp141.pdf
implementationstrong equilibrium(behavioral) group strategy-proofnessnon-rational behaviorstate-contingent choice rules
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Cites Work
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