I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions

DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01498-wzbMath1530.91208arXiv2104.09942OpenAlexW3118103886MaRDI QIDQ6063109

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Yannick Viossat

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.09942

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinformation utilizationBAFOmultistage auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Inefficient rushes in auctions

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