Influential news and policy-making

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01499-9zbMath1530.91309arXiv2108.11177OpenAlexW3198538000MaRDI QIDQ6063111

Federico Vaccari

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.11177

zbMATH Keywords

regulationdisinformationmediamisreportingfake newspolicy-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Competition in costly talk

Cites Work

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