Influential news and policy-making
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Publication:6063111
DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01499-9zbMath1530.91309arXiv2108.11177OpenAlexW3198538000MaRDI QIDQ6063111
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.11177
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