Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
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Publication:6064221
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00324-4zbMath1530.91249MaRDI QIDQ6064221
Publication date: 12 December 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Cites Work
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