Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures

DOI10.1007/s10058-023-00327-9OpenAlexW4317816530MaRDI QIDQ6064224

Yukinori Iwata

Publication date: 12 December 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00327-9

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremopinion-based strategy-proofnessstrategic nominationtwo-stage voting procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Circular domains
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
• Between liberalism and democracy.
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

This page was built for publication: Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures