Efficient two-sided markets with limited information

DOI10.1145/3406325.3451076arXiv2003.07503OpenAlexW3166959235MaRDI QIDQ6065267

Paul Dütting, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 14 November 2023

Published in: Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07503

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarebudget balancetwo-sided marketstruthful mechanismsmechanism design with samples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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