Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

DOI10.1002/net.22018zbMath1530.91044OpenAlexW3124781819MaRDI QIDQ6065828

Giorgio Gnecco, Mauro Passacantando, Yuval Hadas, Marcello Sanguineti

Publication date: 11 December 2023

Published in: Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/net.22018

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamestraffic assignmenttransportation networksuser equilibriumsystem optimumBraess' paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Potential and congestion games (91A14)

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