New axioms for top trading cycles
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Publication:6066263
DOI10.1111/boer.12393zbMath1530.91432arXiv2104.09157MaRDI QIDQ6066263
Chia-Ling Hsu, Yajing Chen, Siwei Chen
Publication date: 15 November 2023
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.09157
characterizationtop trading cycles mechanismmutual best group quota-rationalitymutual best group robust efficiency
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