Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12559OpenAlexW2803740116MaRDI QIDQ6066280

Georges Zaccour, Armando Sacco

Publication date: 15 November 2023

Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12559

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitynoncooperative gamesinternational environmental agreementssocial externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (1)

Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers

Cites Work

• Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

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