Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109030OpenAlexW4386860549MaRDI QIDQ6066859
Francesco De Pretis, William Peden, Mantas Radzvilas
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109030
machine learningdecision under uncertaintyagent-based modellingimprecise probabilityobjective Bayesianismfrequentist statistics
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)
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