Effects of consumers' uncertain valuation-for-quality in a distribution channel
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Publication:6066950
DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03847-7zbMath1527.90014MaRDI QIDQ6066950
Xiaoqing Fan, Guowei Zhu, Jianxiong Zhang
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
product qualityinformativenesswholesale price contractconsignment contractcontract preferenceuncertain valuation
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Production models (90B30) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Consignment contract for mobile apps between a single retailer and competitive developers with different risk attitudes
- Consignment contracting: who should control inventory in the supply chain?
- Mean-risk analysis of wholesale price contracts with stochastic price-dependent demand
- Benefit and risk analysis of consignment contracts
- Double learning or double blinding: an investigation of vendor private information acquisition and consumer learning via online reviews
- The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts
- Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
- Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
- Channel Performance Under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising
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