Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games

DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02826-6zbMath1525.91053OpenAlexW3048806945MaRDI QIDQ6067009

Roland Mühlenbernd

Publication date: 14 December 2023

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02826-6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitysignaling gamesambiguityevolutionary game theorycontextual cuesspeaker and hearer economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Signaling Games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Language Change and the Force of Innovation
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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