Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.104022OpenAlexW4387477202MaRDI QIDQ6067051

Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi, Dvir Gilor

Publication date: 14 December 2023

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.104022

zbMATH Keywords

multi-sided marketsstrong budget balancetruthful auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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