REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12570OpenAlexW4220876078MaRDI QIDQ6067095

Thomas Mariotti, Andrea Attar, François Salanié

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12570

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsmultiple contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets
• On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
• Private Information and Insurance Rejections
• Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
• Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
• An Economic Index of Riskiness
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection
• Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• On competitive nonlinear pricing
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Smooth Preferences

This page was built for publication: REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION